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James S Miller1,2*, Sam Musominali2,3, Michael Baganizi2,3 and Gerald A Paccione2,4,5Abstract
Background: Designing effective incentive systems for village health workers (VHWs) represents a longstanding
policy issue with substantial impact on the success and sustainability of VHW programs. Using performance-based
incentives (PBI) for VHWs is an approach that has been proposed and implemented in some programs, but has
not received adequate review and evaluation in the peer-reviewed literature. We conducted a process evaluation
examining the use of PBI for VHWs in Kisoro, Uganda. In this system, VHWs are paid based on 20 indicators, divided
among routine follow-up visits, health education activities, new patient identifications, sanitation coverage, and
uptake of priority health services.
Methods: Surveys of VHWs (n = 30) and program supervisors (n = 7) were conducted to assess acceptability and
feasibility. Interviews were conducted with all 8 program supervisors and with 6 purposively selected VHWs to gain
a deeper understanding of their views on the PBI system. Program budget records were used to assess the costs of
the program. Detailed payment records were used to assess the fairness of the PBI system with respect to VHWs’
gender, education level, and village location.
Results: In surveys and interviews, supervisors expressed high satisfaction with the PBI system, though some
supervisors expressed concerns about possible negative effects from the variation in payments between VHWs and
the uncertainty of reward for effort. VHWs perceived the system as generally fair, and preferred it to the previous
payment system, but expressed a desire to be paid more. The annual program cost was $516 per VHW, with each
VHW covering an average of 115 households. VHWs covering more households tended to earn more. There was
some evidence that female gender was associated with higher earnings. Education level and proximity to the
district hospital did not appear to be associated with earnings under the PBI system.
Conclusions: In a one-year pilot of PBI within a small VHW program, both VHWs and supervisors found the PBI system
acceptable and motivating. VHWs with relatively limited formal education were able to master the PBI system. Further
research is needed to determine the long-term effects and scalability of PBI, as well as the effects across varied contexts.
Keywords: Developing countries, Incentives, Low-income countries, Primary health care, UgandaBackground
Village health workers (VHWs) have often been proposed
as a central component of primary health care programs
in developing countries [1-4]. The decision of how to
incentivize VHWs represents a longstanding policy
issue within the field of primary health care and has* Correspondence: jsmiller@post.harvard.edu
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reproduction in any medium, provided the orsubstantial impact on the success and sustainability of
VHW programs. Providing proper incentives (whether
monetary or non-monetary) not only provides motivation
to work but also enables programs to retain VHWs and
avoid the disruption caused by widespread attrition [5].
Some programs eschew monetary incentives out of a
concern that the extrinsic motivation provided by money
threatens to eliminate intrinsic motivations, such as a
desire to help or a sense of religious duty [6]. Others,
however, suggest that intrinsic motivations alone may nottd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly credited.
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especially in places where high levels of disease burden
and poverty increase the opportunity cost of volunteering
one’s time – the exact settings in which VHWs are
most needed [7]. However, monetary incentives can
pose a challenge to program administration. Ensuring
that payments are distributed to VHWs in an accountable
and fair manner can be difficult. Using performance-based
incentives (PBI) for VHWs is an approach that has
been proposed and implemented in some programs,
but has not received adequate review and evaluation in
the peer-reviewed literature. We conducted a process
evaluation of the implementation of PBI in a small VHW
program in Kisoro, Uganda. A process evaluation seeks to
examine issues such as acceptability, adherence, feasibility,
quality of implementation, coverage, mechanism of action,
and contextual influences or generalizability. These issues
play a large role in the success of public health programs,
particularly those involving multi-dimensional health
promotion activities, but are often neglected in outcome
evaluations [8].
Previous research on incentives for VHWs offers di-
verging conclusions about the role of non-monetary and
monetary incentives. Prior to initiating this process evalu-
ation, we conducted a literature search and identified and
reviewed 9 studies assessing VHW motivations conducted
in the past 10 years in a range of locations (Ethiopia,
Malawi, South Africa, Kenya, Nigeria, Bangladesh, Nepal,
and Mexico). Of these, 7 evaluated fully volunteer programs
in which VHWs did not receive any monetary incentives,
while 2 evaluated programs in which VHWs retained a
volunteer identity but received some monetary incentives.
Of the 7 evaluations of fully volunteer programs, 4 identi-
fied intrinsic motivations as both VHWs’ main reason for
participation and as effective in maintaining continued
participation [6,9-11]. Only one of these evaluations
explicitly examined attrition, finding it to be under 5% per
year [6]. Two of these studies suggested that spirituality or
religion was a major source of intrinsic motivation [6,10].
It is also worth noting that one of these evaluations [6],
while methodologically sound, primarily examined the
perceptions of decision makers rather than VHWs, and
has thus been criticized as potentially biased [12]. Three
evaluations of fully volunteer programs reported high
dissatisfaction with unpaid volunteer work, which led to
high levels of attrition. One evaluation reported attrition
of 22% over a 1-year period [13], while another reported
33% attrition over only 11 months [14]; the third reported
attrition in an ambiguous manner without specifying a
time period [15]. In one program, the main motivation for
joining was the hope of eventual paid employment [13]; in
all three, VHWs who had left the program reported that
the lack of monetary incentives was the main reason for
their departure [13-15]. However, the two evaluationsof VHWs in paid programs also reported significant
dissatisfaction among VHWs, as the payment amounts
were perceived to be too low [16,17]. In both programs,
hope for better-paid work in the future was a key motiv-
ation for sustained participation [16,17]. We hypothesized
that a PBI system might fulfill the twin goals of maintain-
ing low attrition while also decreasing dissatisfaction with
payment amounts, since motivated VHWs would have the
opportunity to earn more through hard work.
To the best of our knowledge, there are no previous
studies of PBI for VHWs. Previous research on PBI for
other classes of healthcare workers in low income settings
has shown mixed effects. A large study in Rwanda demon-
strated that facility-based pay-for-performance financing
can increase utilization of some maternal and child
health services [18]. A PBI system for individual health-
care workers in Cambodia was associated with increased
overall healthcare utilization as well as increased utilization
of some priority services such as in-facility births [19].
However, other research has suggested that many PBI
systems directed at healthcare worker behavior are in-
effective, or fall prey to unintended consequences such
as diminished intrinsic motivation, adverse selection (e.g.,
avoiding the sickest patients) or gaming (e.g., exaggerating
patients’ severity of illness in order to make improvements
look more impressive) [20-22]. The variability in the results
of PBI is unsurprising – PBI are a tool that can be imple-
mented in many different ways across a wide range of
cultural and institutional contexts. As noted above, this
process evaluation assesses issues such as feasibility,
acceptability, contextual influences, and other such issues
related to implementation. Herein, we do not intend to
assess the impact of PBI on healthcare utilization or
health outcomes.
Kisoro district is a mountainous area in the southwest
of Uganda, nearly 500 km by road from Kampala, the
country’s capital. Average educational attainment re-
mains low – only 17.7% of individuals over 15 years of
age have completed primary school, and only 4% of indi-
viduals over 20 have completed secondary school; 89% of
its inhabitants make a living as subsistence farmers [23].
Doctors for Global Health (DGH), Kisoro District Hospital
(KDH), and Albert Einstein College of Medicine collabor-
ate to implement community health programs in Kisoro,
including a VHW program. In May 2010, they instituted
a PBI system, in which VHWs are paid based on com-
pletion of a set of priority health activities. Prior to the
PBI system, two previous payment systems had been used:
first, a monthly salary system, and then a per-visit system,
in which VHWs were paid for each household they visited
during the month, up to a limit of 80. Under the per-visit
system, supervisors did not verify that recorded visits
had in fact occurred. In the PBI system, VHWs are
paid based on 20 indicators, divided among routine
Table 1 Summary of performance-based incentive system
Incentive item Amount
Ugandan
shillings
Dollars1
Routine visits
Visit to patient with acute illness or recent
discharge from hospital
500 $0.25
Medication delivery to chronic disease
patient
500 $0.25
Annual family information form
completed
400 $0.20
Monthly follow-up visit 300 $0.15
Identification of new patients
Chronic disease patient identified 1,000 $0.50
Pregnant woman identified and
counseled
1,000 $0.50
Neonate identified and visited 500 $0.25
Malnourished child identified and referred 1,000 $0.50
Disabled child identified and referred 1,000 $0.50
Death identified and family counseled 500 $0.25
‘Difficult home’ identified2 500 $0.25
Sanitation risk identified (i.e., home with
very poor sanitation)
500 $0.25
Sanitation facilities
New latrine or kitchen constructed in
village
2,000 $1.00
New bath shelter, compost pit, or drying
rack constructed
1,000 $0.50
Visits completed by patients (referral and accompaniment)
Family planning visit 1,000 $0.50
Cervical cancer screening visit 1,000 $0.50
Antenatal care visit 500 $0.25
Child immunization visit 500 $0.25
Health education
Community talk ≤15 attendees 1,000 $0.50
Community talk >15 attendees 2,000 $1.00
Talk with staff member observing 3,000 $1.50
Attendance at ‘nutrition day’
(malnutrition management outreach)
1,500 $0.75
1Based on an exchange rate of 2,000 shillings to $1, the approximate
exchange rate when the scheme was designed in early 2010.
2‘Difficult home’ refers to domestic violence, child abuse, immunization refusal,
or other family problem. It mainly serves as a euphemism for domestic
violence or child abuse.
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screening and case identifications, improvements in sani-
tation coverage, and uptake of priority health services
(antenatal care, family planning, cervical cancer screening,
and childhood immunization) by patients in their care. A
large proportion of VHWs’ salary is based on the PBI sys-
tem – they do not receive any “base pay” except for a
small stipend when they attend training (which can be
used to pay for a motorcycle taxi, or can be pocketed by
pocketed by VHWs if they travel on foot or bicycle).
Terms such as ‘performance-based incentives’, ‘results-
based financing’, and ‘pay-for-performance’ can have a wide
range of meanings. Therefore, at this stage it is important
to define how we are using the term ‘performance-
based incentives’. As the range of payment items suggests,
this system contains both activity-based incentives and
performance-based incentives. Activity-based incentives
are payments for completing a given action, e.g., deliv-
ering medication to a patient, or delivering a community
education presentation, which only require the VHW to
show up. Performance-based incentives are payments that
reflect the skill and effectiveness of the VHW, e.g., the
VHW’s ability to educate and assist community members
in building latrines or attending antenatal care. While this
PBI system does not employ measures of health outcomes,
we suggest that measures such as sanitation coverage,
identification of patients with chronic disease or malnutri-
tion, and the use of immunizations, family planning,
antenatal care, and cervical cancer screening services,
nonetheless represent key measures of health system
performance.
Table 1 summarizes the PBI system used in Kisoro,
providing more detail on the individual incentive items.
Payment amounts for different items were selected based
on three criteria: 1) public health or clinical importance;
2) estimated incidence; and 3) expected difficulty for
VHWs. VHWs use a paper-based record system to docu-
ment their work each month. Eight DGH and KDH staff
members work part-time as program supervisors. Supervi-
sors visit each VHW twice a month, providing continued
training and clinical support, and making home visits to
verify incentive items recorded by VHWs.
Methods
Surveys of VHWs and program supervisors
Anonymous, written surveys were conducted to assess
perceptions of the PBI system among VHWs and program
supervisors. Both surveys contained a mix of closed and
open-response questions. Surveys were distributed to 34
VHWs who had worked in the program since its inception
(and thus were familiar with the PBI system as well as
previous payment systems), as well as to 8 program
supervisors (two of whom had joined the program in
the past year, and thus were only familiar with the PBIsystem). Open-response answers on VHW surveys com-
pleted in Rufumbira were translated into English by a DGH
staff member and then coded using thematic analysis.
Interviews of VHWs and program supervisors
Semi-structured interviews were conducted to provide a
deeper understanding of issues explored in the surveys.
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and 8 with program supervisors. The 6 VHWs were pur-
posively selected to balance age, gender,a and earnings
under the PBI system. All 8 program supervisors were
interviewed; each interview lasted approximately half an
hour. One VHW interview was conducted directly in
English; the remaining 5 were conducted in Rufumbira,
using a translator fluent in English and Rufumbira. All
supervisor interviews were conducted in English. All inter-
viewees provided written consent prior to their interview.
All interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed. For
the VHW interviews conducted in Rufumbira, a different
translator was used to assist in transcription to verify the
accuracy of translation. Interview transcripts were read
and re-read multiple times to gain familiarity with the data
and identify emerging themes. Thematic content analysis
was then used to analyze and summarize the results. Ex-
amples of emerging themes were collected and organized.
These examples were then re-examined to add additional
themes and re-categorize initial themes. Frequencies of
themes were also tabulated to provide a way of checking
the validity of the emerging themes and guard against
‘cherry-picking’ [24].
Program costs and attrition
Information obtained from program budget records was
used to calculate the costs of using PBI. Costs were esti-
mated for a one-year period from May 2010 to April
2011, which was the first year of operation of the PBI
system. Information on VHW attrition from the program
was also obtained from program records.
Quantitative analysis of VHW earnings
Data on VHWs’ annual earnings, productivity, and demo-
graphic information were obtained from program records.
The distance from each village to the hospital by road was
measured using district maps and Google Earth (Google
Corp., Mountain View, California, USA). This analysis fo-
cused on the effects of VHW and village characteristics on
earnings under the PBI system. Analysis was conducted
using Stata 11 (Stata Corp., College Station, Texas, USA).
Graphs, t-tests, and simple linear regression models were
used to conduct initial assessments of important associa-
tions. Multiple linear regression models were used to
adjust for potential confounding variables.
Project approval
The research presented here was conducted as a compo-
nent of on-going monitoring and evaluation of a new pro-
gram. Ethical approval for the publication of this research
was obtained from the Montefiore Medical Center Institu-
tional Review Board and the London School of Hygiene
and Tropical Medicine Ethics Committee.Results
Surveys of VHWs and program supervisors
Thirty out of 34 VHWs completed the survey, yielding a
response rate of 88%; 7 out of 8 (88%) supervisor surveys
were returned. To facilitate comparison, the results of
both surveys are presented together. Due to the small
number of supervisors, fractions rather than percentages
have been provided.
When VHWs were asked an open-response question
about what they liked about the PBI system, the most
common theme was fairness – 13 (43%) respondents
included comments about the PBI system distributing
payments fairly, based on effort expended. When asked
what they disliked about the PBI system, 9 (30%) respon-
dents wrote “nothing”, while an additional 9 (30%) offered
complaints about specific incentive items. When asked
what they liked about the PBI system, the main benefits
mentioned by supervisors were its fairness (5/7), that
VHWs work harder (6/7), and that it results in greater
health improvements in the villages (5/7). When asked
what they disliked about the PBI system, concerns men-
tioned by supervisors included that VHWs are paid too
little (3/7), that it requires too much work by supervisors
(2/7), and that it is unfair to VHWs who cover fewer
households (2/7).
VHWs and supervisors were also asked to compare
the PBI system to the prior incentive system in which
they were paid for each household visited per month.
When asked to indicate which system is fairer, 22 (73%)
VHWs stated that the PBI system is fairer and 7 (23%)
stated that the prior system was fairer, with 1 VHW not
responding. Of the 6 supervisors who had worked under
both systems, all 6 stated that the PBI system was fairer.
When VHWs were asked which payment system they
felt improves health more, 25 (83%) stated that the PBI
system improves health more, 2 (6%) stated that the
prior system improved health more, and 3 (10%) did
not answer. When asked why they believe that the
chosen system improves health more, of those choosing
the PBI system 5 (20%) mentioned that VHWs do more
work under the PBI system, 9 (36%) mentioned that
supervisors are more involved under the PBI system,
and 5 (20%) specifically mentioned sanitation improve-
ments in their villages. Of the 6 supervisors who worked
under both systems, all 6 said the PBI system improves
health more. When asked why, they stated that VHWs
work harder under the PBI system (4/6), and that
supervisors provide more medical treatment in the
villages under the PBI system (3/6). Finally, VHWs
were asked under which system they earned more
money; 17 VHWs (56%) estimated that they earn more
money under the PBI system, 6 (20%) estimated they
earned more under the prior system, and 7 (23%) did
not select an answer.
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Six purposively selected VHWs were interviewed, all of
whom have served as VHWs since the program’s incep-
tion. Emerging themes were grouped in three main areas:
1) perceptions of fairness of the PBI system, payment
amounts, and volunteerism; 2) non-financial incentives;
and 3) relationships with their communities. For both the
VHW and supervisor interviews, individuals are given
numbers to demonstrate when the same individual is
quoted repeatedly.
VHWs viewed the PBI system as fair due to the per-
ceived lack of forgery under this system, compared with
the acknowledged forgery of household visits under the
prior incentive system (i.e., VHWs would note in their
records that they had visited a household without actu-
ally making the visit). Four of the 6 VHWs interviewed
mentioned that they liked the PBI system because
VHWs are “paid for the work done”, or another similar
phrase. Two VHWs explicitly contrasted this character-
istic to the forgery that occurred under the prior system.
VHW 5 explains:
“Unlike the old system, where most VHWs [village
health workers] would be paid for things they had not
done – not all of us, but some of us, would forge…This
system is genuine – there is nothing like mistrust. It is
genuine – you are paid for what you did”.
Thus, VHWs seemed to feel that it was important for
a payment system to reward hard work (while paying
less to those who did not work as hard).
However, VHWs did not always feel that the PBI system
sufficiently rewarded them for effort expended. Three
out of 6 VHWs expressed frustration at putting in effort
looking for case identifications (i.e., conducting screening
for malnutrition, chronic disease, etc.) without finding
anything for which they would be paid, or about conduct-
ing unreimbursed follow-up visits. VHW 1 explains:
“Sometimes you move, like doing sensitization
[education], and other things, you move, you don’t find
some things to record. But of course you have done
[something], because you have spent time in the village”.
All the VHWs interviewed also expressed a desire to
be paid more. Dissatisfaction with payment amounts was
driven in part by the inflation that Uganda experienced
in early 2011. Four out of 6 VHWs mentioned the issue
of inflation as an important concern.
Perceptions of fair recompense are of course tied to
the VHWs’ willingness to volunteer their time. All VHWs
interviewed considered themselves voluntary workers ra-
ther than employees, a distinction they felt was important
for their relationship with their communities. They alsoemphasized that they did not view their work as VHWs
as a career path or as a primary income source, but
rather as an avocation undertaken for the benefit of
their communities. However, they did not feel capable
of offering a great deal of volunteer time due to their
other work and obligations to their families. Three VHWs
described the opportunity cost of serving as VHWs as a
challenge. VHW 4 explains:
“You also realize that when you devote 3 days to
village health work, it is some kind of loss because you
are not doing other things”.
VHW 1 offers a more nuanced description, expressing
the same concept of an opportunity cost:
“We take much time in the village, in the community,
trying to move door to door, looking for the patients,
trying to sensitize some of the people, which does not
allow us to do our personal work. And in return, the
money given to us does not accommodate the work we
would be doing at home…So that’s the challenge, isn’t it”.
VHW 5 also presented the issue as a direct opportun-
ity cost, suggesting that VHWs should be paid a stipend
equivalent to what a day laborer would receive for work-
ing in the fields, so that they could hire someone to till
their crops while they conducted their work as VHWs.
Together, these responses suggest that VHWs perceive
themselves neither as fully volunteers nor as salaried
employees. None of the VHW expressed a desire to pro-
gress to full-time healthcare work, or be paid a salary
equivalent to a healthcare worker. However, they felt
strongly that they should be compensated for the time
that they would otherwise spend farming.
VHWs also discussed a number of intrinsic motivations
for their work. Five out of the 6 VHWs mentioned that
they enjoyed the knowledge and skills they gained from
training sessions, and the status this training gave them in
their villages. Two VHWs also commented that this
knowledge benefited them and their families by allowing
them to maintain their own health. VHW 6 commented:
“Ever since I joined I acquired a lot that helped
improve my household…in case I get a disease, I have
skills so I know how to handle it before I get very sick”.
All 6 VHWs mentioned the benefit to their commu-
nity as an important motivating factor for their partici-
pation. VHW 3 noted:
“What makes me happy as a VHW is that I help
community members who elected me, and who trusted
me, and I help them in health issues”.
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focused mainly on clinical services and sanitation improve-
ments. VHWs also emphasized that close supervision
under the PBI system was beneficial – 5 out of 6 VHWs
mentioned that the education and clinical work of supervi-
sors increased their status in the village or increased the
community’s trust in them. One VHW explained:
“Even if the supervisor teaches the same things as the
VHW, then the communities will say, yeah, the VHW
was teaching things that she knows”.
VHWs offered varying perspectives on whether being
paid affected their relationship with their villages. All
VHWs felt that payment was a sensitive issue, and took
pains to emphasize to their communities that they were
volunteers rather than salaried employees. Two VHWs
felt that being paid did not affect their relationship with
the community, because they were still perceived as
volunteers. VHW 3 explained:
“The community members are not even aware that we
are paid. Community members know that we are
voluntary workers, and we are not working for the
government, so whatever stipend we get is between us
and the supervisors”.
However, the other 4 VHWs seemed to feel that being
paid did create tension in their relationship with their
villages. VHW 6 explained:
“Most [people] are happy because of the work we are
doing for them. The services we offer make them feel
happy. But maybe some people say that these [VHWs]
are working for their pay, so if you give them time you
are giving them more money…You know that jealousy
is always there in the community”.
Though the VHWs’ services are provided to the com-
munity for free, the knowledge that VHWs have found
part-time paid employment appears to engender resent-
ment nonetheless.
All 8 program supervisors were interviewed; 4 of the
supervisors are healthcare workers at KDH and the
remaining 4 are DGH staff members without clinical
training. The interview results from both groups have
been presented together in order to preserve anonymity.
Overall, supervisors expressed a higher level of satis-
faction with the PBI system than VHWs. Supervisors
perceived the PBI system as fairer than the prior incentive
system due to the lack of forgery. Six of the 8 supervisors
mentioned the concept of the PBI system being ‘results-
oriented’, VHWs being “paid for the work done”, or an-
other similar phrase. Supervisor 7 explained:“I think the new [PBI] system is very genuine. Because
if you work hard, then you earn more. If you work less,
then you get less. And it’s the most fair [system]”.
Even more than VHWs, the supervisors were insistent
about the problem of forgery under the prior incentive
system. Five of the 6 supervisors who had worked under
the prior system asserted that there had been forgery of
VHW records. All 8 supervisors were similarly insistent
that the PBI system prevented this kind of forgery because
the verification process provided little opportunity for it.
Supervisor 3 explained:
“This is actually what is observed on the ground. We
can’t stipend something that we’ve not seen. We have
to first observe what is done. If it is a pregnant
woman, we have to first see that one. If it is a toilet,
we have to see that one and see that it is a verified one
and then we give a stipend for that. So I believe there
is no faking”.
Several supervisors also mentioned that they felt the
PBI system gave them a more substantive role during
supervision, as well as increasing the community’s trust
in the VHW.
Despite their satisfaction with the lack of forgery, 5 of
the 8 supervisors expressed some discomfort with what
they perceived as the competitive nature of the PBI sys-
tem or the possibility that VHWs would expend effort
without a definite reward. Three supervisors mentioned
the wide distribution of payment amounts under the PBI
system, saying that it discouraged the VHWs who earned
less. Two supervisors also mentioned that it is discour-
aging or unfair for VHWs to put in substantial effort
searching for new case identifications (i.e., conducting
screening) without necessarily being rewarded. Super-
visor 2 explained:
“You know, to identify an item that will be rewarded.
It takes some hours. You can imagine someone,
moving from home to home looking for a pregnant
mother. Suppose he fails to get a pregnant mother, goes
home, and those hours are not rewarded…So it’s [the
PBI system] good, but somehow it’s tricky”.
In addition to this concern about the uncertain rewards
provided by the PBI system, 5 of the 8 supervisors also
mentioned that they felt VHWs should be paid more.
Program costs
The total annual cost of the VHW program using the
PBI system was $18,000 (from May 2010 to April 2011).
The main areas of expenditure were the VHW incentives
(27.5%), training costs (30.5%), and supervision (27.9%),
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The paper forms used for record-keeping constituted
an additional 1.8% of the total, though they were donated
and did not represent an actual outlay by DGH. The total
cost per VHW was $516, with each VHW serving an aver-
age of 115 households. Based on the average household
size in Kisoro district [23], this cost equals $1.12 per
individual served by the program per year. Table 2
provides a more detailed breakdown of the program costs.
VHW attrition
Overall, attrition has been low. The program began with
40 VHWs; during the first three years (prior to the PBI
system), 4 VHWs quit or were dropped from the pro-
gram due to poor performance. During the year in which
the PBI system was implemented, one VHW died unex-
pectedly and another was dropped from the program
due to poor performance and unprofessional behavior.
Quantitative analysis of VHW earnings
The dataset analyzed here included 34 VHWs; 15 (44%)
were male and 19 (56%) were female. VHWs hadTable 2 Annual program expenditures1
Category Item Annual cost ($)2
VHW stipends VHW stipends $4,953 (27.5%)
Training Materials (incl. VHW lunch, snack,
and transportation refunds)
$3,795
Facilitator pay $891
Standardized patient program $805
Total $5,490 (30.5%)
Supervision Supervisor pay $3,251
Transportation $1,779
Total $5,030 (27.9%)
Administration Staff pay $1,856
Cell phone airtime $340
Total $2,195 (12.2%)
Donated costs Program forms $331 (1.8%)
Total costs Annual total cost $18,000 (100%)
Annual total cost – per VHW $516
Annual total cost – per
household served
$4.61
Annual total cost – per
individual served3
$1.12
1For VHW stipends, actual expenditures were used. For all other categories,
budgeted expenditures were used. This will tend to overestimate training
costs, since it assumes 100% attendance at training.
2An exchange rate of 2,120 Ugandan shillings per dollar has been used, the
exchange rate as of May 1, 2010 (historical exchange rate obtained from: XE
Current and Historical Rate Tables [http://www.xe.com/currencycharts/?
from=USD&to=UGX&view=2Y], accessed July 5, 2011).
3Population of villages served estimated using the average household size for
Muramba subcounty (taken from: Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2002 Uganda
Population and Housing Census: Kisoro District Report. Entebbe: Uganda
Bureau of Statistics, November 2005).completed an average of 8.9 years of schooling; 12
VHWs had attended some or all of primary school (but
no secondary school), 18 had attended some secondary
school, and 4 had completed secondary school. On aver-
age, males had completed slightly more formal educa-
tion than females (a mean of 9.3 vs. 8.5 years).
VHWs were responsible for an average of 115 house-
holds, which translates to an estimated average of 471
individuals, based on the average household size in Kisoro
district [23]. The average distance to the district hospital
(KDH) by road was 9 km. Table 3 displays the mean,
standard deviation and range for each of the continuous
variables mentioned above.
The mean annual pay was $144 ($12 per month). Figure 1
displays a histogram of annual pay, demonstrating a slightly
right-skewed distribution and a wide range of payment
amounts. For the first year of operation of the PBI system,
the average annual payment was essentially identical to
earnings under the prior incentive system. However, the
PBI system resulted in a greater range of payments – the
highest-earning VHWs earned 3 to 5 times as much as the
lowest-earning VHWs.
The impact of VHW and village characteristics on
earnings under the PBI system has implications both for
the fairness of the system and the selection of VHWs.
We examined the relationships between annual pay and
number of households served, gender, education level,
and distance from the hospital.
Number of households
The number of households for which a VHW is re-
sponsible is a strong predictor of annual pay. Simple
linear regression confirms the strength of the association
(t = 4.89, P <0.001); the strength of the association persists
when adjusting for potential confounding. The details of
the regression model results for all variables considered
are given in Table 4.
Gender
The mean annual pay for women was $159, compared
with $126 for men. A t-test suggested that this difference
could be due to chance (t = –1.52, P = 0.1381; full results
not shown in Table 4), though adjusting for education,
distance from the hospital, and number of households
using a multivariable regression model strengthened theTable 3 Characteristics of VHWs and their villages
Measure Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Years of education 8.9 3.1 2 15
Households served 115 52.7 63 280
Est. population served 471 216 258 1,148
Distance from hospital (km) 9.0 2.6 4.6 12.7
Annual pay ($) 144 65 40 306
Figure 1 Histogram of annual pay.
Table 4 Regression results for annual pay1
Explanatory variable Coefficient Std. error t-value P > | t |
Number of households
Number of households 0.800 0.164 4.89 <0.0001
Constant 52.6 20.6 2.55 0.016
r-squared 0.427
Adjusted r-squared 0.409
Education
Years of education –0.127 4 –0.03 0.973
Constant 146 34 4.23 <0.001
r-squared 0
Adjusted r-squared –0.0312
Distance from hospital
Distance from hospital (km) 4.91 4.25 1.15 0.257
Constant 100 39.9 2.51 0.017
r-squared 0.0400
Adjusted r-squared 0.0100
Full adjusted model
Number of households 0.849 0.180 4.66 <0.0001
Female gender 36.3 17.2 2.11 0.044
Education 0.462 3.08 0.15 0.882
Distance from hospital (km) –1.12 4.05 –0.28 0.783
Constant 34.0 54.1 0.63 0.535
r-squared 0.512
Adjusted r-squared 0.445
1The original data for annual pay was in units of Ugandan shillings. An
exchange rate of 2,120 shillings to $1 was used for this conversion, the
exchange rate as of May 1, 2010 (historical exchange rate obtained from:
XE Current and Historical Rate Tables, [http://www.xe.com/currencycharts/?
from=USD&to=UGX&view=2Y], accessed July 5, 2011).
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annual pay (t = 2.11, P <0.044).
Education level
Simple linear regression showed no association between
level of education and earnings under the PBI system
(t = –0.03, P = 0.973). Adjusting for possible confounders
produced little change in the result.
Distance from the hospital
VHWs in villages further from the hospital tended to
earn more, though the association was not statistically
significant (t = 1.15, P = 0.257). Furthermore, the slight
association was likely due to confounding with number
of households, since VHWs further from the hospital
covered, on average, more households. The adjusted
multiple regression model showed no indication of an
association (t = –0.28, P = 0.783).
Finally, the PBI system facilitates easy measurement
of VHWs’ productivity. Among other activities, in the
annual data examined here, VHWs identified and referred
210 malnourished children, identified and counseled 791
pregnant women, visited and examined 679 neonates,
referred or accompanied 188 women for new family
planning uptake, and completed 5,672 home visits to
patients with an identified need.
Discussion
In this assessment of PBI for VHWs, we found overall
satisfaction with the PBI system was high, though both
VHWs and supervisors also reported specific concerns
about the PBI system – most notably dissatisfaction with
payment amounts. Attrition from the program was fairly
low both before and after implementation of the PBI sys-
tem. Our quantitative analysis of VHW earnings suggests
that the PBI system operates fairly with respect to educa-
tion level, gender, and proximity to the district hospital.
Previous research suggests that dissatisfaction with
payment amounts represents one drawback of monetary
incentives [5,16,17]. In this evaluation, both supervisors
and VHWs felt that the PBI system distributed payments
according to the amount of work accomplished. How-
ever, both VHWs and supervisors agreed that VHWs
should be paid more. VHWs expressed dissatisfaction
with both the overall level of payment as well as with
the uncertainty of reward for case-finding (i.e., that
screening did not always lead to case-finding). These
concerns may reflect decreased intrinsic motivation in
the setting of PBI. However, VHWs also expressed dis-
satisfaction with their pay under the prior incentive
system (in which they were paid per household visited).
Most VHWs in fact believed they were earning more
under the PBI system, suggesting that this dissatisfaction
with payment amounts is not specifically linked to a PBI
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isfaction with payment amounts adversely impacted the
quality of their work, or merely represented an expression
of the near-universal human desire to be paid more. How-
ever, the low level of attrition perhaps suggests that the
VHWs’ dissatisfaction with payment amounts has not
significantly impacted the success of the program.
In response to these results, DGH and KDH have added
additional incentives for routine data collection and train-
ing performance, increasing the average payment level
to $20 per month ($240 per year). Future program
monitoring and evaluation will reveal whether this increase
resolves VHWs’ concerns about payment amounts or
merely establishes a new set point from which to bargain.
VHWs expressed mixed views about volunteerism in
the program. VHWs felt they should be compensated
well enough to ensure that the time they spent on their
work as VHWs did not have a negative effect on their
families’ wellbeing. However, they framed their request
as a desire to paid at the same level as an unskilled farm
laborer, suggesting some level of volunteerism, since they
were not seeking payment at the level of the ‘market value’
for their skills. In some VHW programs, the desire for
future, better-paid employment is a key motivating factor
[13,16]; this did not appear to be the case in the program
evaluated here. All VHWs interviewed mentioned intrinsic
motivations, such as knowledge gained and the satisfac-
tion of seeing health improvements in their village, as
reasons for their participation. However, the fact that
VHWs are paid emerged as a potential area of friction
between VHWs and their communities due to jealousy
among some community members that the VHWs had
secured part-time paid employment.
The PBI system requires close supervision of VHWs,
which has the benefit of bringing clinicians into the
communities. Close supervision also enables the continu-
ous collection of well-validated data via the PBI system,
creating the potential for rigorous program monitoring.
The benefits of the PBI system described by supervisors
and VHWs may have resulted in part from the closer
supervision built into the PBI system. In one sense, this
represents an obstacle to assessing the PBI system, since it
is difficult to disentangle the effect of the PBI system from
the effect of closer supervision. In another sense, as noted
in the interviews with supervisors, closer supervision is
facilitated by the PBI system, in that the PBI system
provides greater structure for the supervisory role. Pre-
vious research suggests that close supervision is critical
to VHW program functioning [5]. Regardless of the in-
centive model selected, we suggest that VHW programs
are unlikely to be successful without providing frequent
supervision. In this light, it is encouraging that the
actual incentive payments comprised less than 30% of
total program costs.The quantitative analysis of VHW earnings reveals
several notable findings. VHWs with greater education
earned no more than those with less education, suggesting
that VHWs with limited formal education can master a
PBI system. Contrary to our expectations based on gender
inequality [25], female VHWs out-earned male VHWs
under the PBI system. The success of female VHWs under
the PBI system may stem from greater effort expended, or
from the greater trust that other women place in them
(since many of the incentives pertain to maternal and
child health). We hypothesized two possible effects of
proximity to the hospital: that VHWs in more distant
villages would find it more difficult to refer patients for
services mainly available at the hospital (such as family
planning and cervical cancer screening), or that people
in more remote villages would have less access to other
health services and would rely more on their VHW. How-
ever, we did not find evidence of an association between
proximity and VHW earnings under the PBI system.
These results suggest that the PBI system operates in
a fair way, at least with respect to the demographic
characteristics of VHWs and their villages. Payment
amounts were higher for VHWs with more households.
While this could suggest that it is easier for these
VHWs to succeed under the PBI system, it seems more
likely that VHWs serving more households must ex-
pend more time and effort in order to care for a larger
population. Furthermore, if the PBI system acts as an
accurate measure of performance, then VHWs in larger
villages are simply being paid for greater performance
(e.g., helping a greater number of people gain access to
services such as improved sanitation, family planning,
malnutrition treatment, etc.).
This work has a number of limitations. The most sig-
nificant limitation is that we evaluated a relatively small
VHW program over a relatively brief period of time,
within a specific programmatic and cultural context. Thus,
this process evaluation serves as an initial overview of a
new system rather than any sort of definitive assessment.
In addition, while this evaluation allowed us to assess
issues such as the feasibility and acceptability of PBI for
VHWs, it does not provide information on outcomes.
Due to the data available, we are unable to assess the
impact of the PBI system on utilization of priority health
services in Kisoro relative to other possible payment
systems. As the productivity data presented in the
results demonstrate, the PBI system generates metrics
(such as malnutrition case-finding and treatment) that
could be used as outcome metrics. However, we did not
have data for any of these metrics prior to the imple-
mentation of the PBI system, preventing a before-after
comparison. A larger evaluation with the resources to
prospectively track case-finding and utilization of care
would be needed for an impact evaluation.
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own limitations. Some VHWs have only basic literacy,
and may have had difficulty in fully comprehending the
questions on the survey. One potential limitation of the
interviews is that they reflect the views of only 6 VHWs.
Although there was substantial thematic overlap across
the 6 interviews, it is possible they do not represent the
full range of views. The complex issue of reflexivity also
poses potential problems. The first author previously
spent a year as a DGH volunteer in Kisoro, Uganda,
working on a variety of community health programs
including the VHW program. Thus, it is possible that
VHWs and supervisors were reluctant to offer criticism
to someone they viewed as a colleague. Alternatively,
given the prevailing culture of politeness and group
solidarity in Kisoro, it is also possible that VHWs and
supervisors would be more willing to offer criticism to
someone they knew than to an outsider. It is also pos-
sible that the VHWs viewed the surveys and interviews
as an opportunity to lobby for greater pay, and exagger-
ated that concern. The small number of VHWs in this
program also limited the power of statistical tests used in
the quantitative analysis. This process evaluation also did
not include any evaluation of community perspectives on
the program and the PBI system.
Further research is also needed to assess the long-term
impact of PBI incentives, and particularly whether they
diminish intrinsic motivation over time and, if so, whether
diminished intrinsic motivation harms program func-
tioning. Considerable evidence in the psychological and
economic literature suggests that extrinsic rewards under-
mine intrinsic motivation [26,27]. However, it is unclear
whether this research applies to long-term employment,
or whether different payment schemes for VHWs (e.g.,
salary vs. PBI) would have differing effects on intrinsic
motivation. An additional concern presented in the lit-
erature suggests that PBI may lead to distortions, in
which workers focus on incentivized activities and neglect
non-incentivized activities [28,29]. While this evaluation
did not specifically address this issue, we suggest that
distortions are less likely in PBI for VHWs than for other
healthcare workers, since the more limited scope of prac-
tice of VHWs makes it easier to create a comprehensive
PBI system that incentivizes many if not all of the desired
activities of VHWs. In addition, if incentive amounts for
different accomplishments are accurately calibrated with
the health benefits, then VHWs will have an incentive to
allocate their effort appropriately. Incentive amounts
can also be adjusted at different times of the year based
on seasonal variation in health needs, e.g., increasing
incentives for malaria prevention and diagnosis in the
rainy seasons. Incentive amounts can easily be adjusted
upward over time to keep pace with inflation or to reward
increasingly long-serving and experienced VHWs, just assalaries might increase over time. However, assessment of
these issues will require long-term follow-up.
Conclusions
This process evaluation demonstrates that a PBI system
can be motivating, acceptable, and feasible for VHWs
and supervisors, at least in short-term follow-up and
within a particular cultural and institutional context. How-
ever, the longer-term effects of the PBI system remain
uncertain. VHWs with limited formal education were
able to master the PBI system and perform as well as
colleagues with more formal education. A PBI system
requires close supervision of VHWs and detailed record
keeping. Apart from the impact on VHWs and supervi-
sors, a main strength of PBI is that the operation of the
incentive system automatically generates useful data. PBI
thus have the potential to improve monitoring and evalu-
ation by providing objective, verified metrics of program
performance. Further evaluation is needed to assess the
scalability and transferability of PBI for VHWs, as well as
the impact on outcome measures.
Endnote
aWe use the word “gender” rather than “sex” throughout
this paper, since the hypothesized differences in earnings
relate to the social structure of Ugandan society rather
than any biological characteristics.
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